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RESPONSIBLE COOPERATION IN FOREIGN POLICY 
- BIPARTISANSHIP REDEFINED -
On February 20th President Eisenhower spoke over the airways 
on the Middle Eastern situation. Earlier that same day the President had 
met at the White House with Congressional leaders of both parties. As a 
matter of fact the suggestion that he speak to the nation had come from 
Senator Richard Russell of Georgia during the meeting . 
The President's speech was addressed primarily to the qu~stion 
of Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba. In the 
process, however , be set forth in clear terms the problems facing us in 
the Middle East. It was abo possible to discern in his remarks for the 
first time the dim outlines of the Administration's policy for meeting 
these problems . 
A few days later, Secretary of State Dulles requested that Con~ 
greseional leaders confer with him at hie home on the Middle Ea&tern 
situation. The conference was held on the eve of a major session of the 
United Nations General Assembly where a move to impose sanctions on 
I s rael was anticipated. 
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Both of these meetings were bailed in the press as examples 
of effective bipartisanship which in fact they were. They were followed 
by the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of 
Aqaba, an objective of the Administration's policy. This withdrawal, 
however, was accomplished without United Nations sanctions being 
imposed, a course to which Congressional sentiment was clearly opposed. 
It is imposei?le to uace the precise impact of the two meetings 
on the subsequent events . That they had considerable influence , however, 
seems clear . What the meetings served to do was to clarify the situation 
in the Middle East for Congressional leaders. This was done, moreover, 
before not after an irrevocable course had been set by the Administl'ation. -
Hence the possibility of partisan reaction in Congress was reduced. 
Conversely, the meetings clarified for the President and the 
Secretary of State the dimensions of acceptable policy in dealing with the 
immediate crisis in the Middle East. By assembling tbe Onngressional 
leaders, the President and the Secretary of State had availed themselves 
of the advice of a group of men not only attuned to attitudes in both 
parties but also to popular sentiment in various regions of the country. 
Take, for example, the geographic origins of the Democratic 
leaders who attended the February ZOth meeting with the Pl,".csident. The 
Democratic Party in Congress is sometimes thought of as the special 
preserve of the South or even more specifically of the State of Texas . 
This is a tribute to the majority lea<Wr of the Senate , Lyndon Johnson 
and to Sam. Rayburn, the Speaker of the House. Both men were in fact 
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in attendance at the White House meeting and the South was also repre-
sented in the person of Senator Russell , But Senator Theodore F . Green 
of Rhode Island was also presont as waa Senator William Fulbright of 
Arka.nsa.s and myself, as \l;'hip , from Montana. Frorn the House came 
majority leader John McCormack of Na.ssachusetts and the Whip, Car l 
Albert of Oklahoma and Congressman Tom Gordon of Ulinois , ae well 
as Speaker Rayburn. 
When the Republicans in attendance are added to this group, 
a picture of geographic representation at the meeting w ith the President 
emerges which covers ever y sector of the nation. It also embraces 
virtually all shades of opinion in both parties in Congress . 
Policy made by the President and the Secretary of State 
against a background of this kind is almost certain to carry a greater 
measure of public and Congressional support than policy made without 
it. The policy may not be as sensational in its impact abroad as a 
dramatic unUateral action by the President, reinforced by the flarn -
boyant tce \Jnlquee of modern pv.Wlic relations. It 1s likely to be, 
however. a more profound, more reasaurina and enduring policy. 
That in esaence ie the most that can be expected of bipartisanship. If 
it gives to foreign policy the deep and etable roots of wide public and 
party acceptance , bipartisanship ha.s given a great deal. 
Unfor tunately, this vital function of bipartisanship bas been 
obscured by misuse of the word in recent y are . Bipartisanship has been 
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invoked repeatedly as though it were some kind of litany which if repeated 
often enough :vould insure popularity for unpopular policies . It has often 
been wielded as a club to silence responsible criticism of foreign policy. 
It luls been applied as a catalyst in efforts by the Executive Branch to 
urge measures of foreign policy through Congreae. Misuse of bipartisan-
ship in these ways often tends in tin.t.e to stimulate precisely the opposite 
reactions. 
Bipartisanship is not a magical formula capable ol. producing 
national unanimity where there are deep divisions. Nor is it a convenient 
cloak under which to conceal these divbiono from foreign eyes • 
.Americans differ on foreign issues no lose than on domestic 
issues . Bipartieanship cannot ex~cise these differences . Properly 
understood and used, however. it can help to minimize them.. It can 
act to produce the widest possible area of accommodation among sectional 
and party viewpoints in support of essential action abroad. 
The need for that accommodation ls very great in a world 
which bas closed in rapidly on the nation during the past two decades . 
With the jete and mltasUeo overhead and the echoes of nuclear bomb 
testa in v~!oue part& of the world. we have little chr;ice as a nation but 
to stand together in foreign policy if we are to stand at all . If the warn-
ing of the weapons of mass destruction is lost Oft us. a defense budget 
of about $40 billion a year and foreign aid of over $50 billion in the past 
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decade should servo to remind uo that we are deeply involved in a 
highly volatile world. We will either play our part n.e carefully and 
as unitedly as we can or there may be no world left in which to play. 
In domestic affairs, . leadership from the majority party and 
a "responsible opposition" !rom the minority is normally sufficient to 
keep the country on a reasonably level keel . In foreign affairs, however , 
this political mechanil!ltn is no longel' sufficient for effective national 
action. It is not enough that foreign policy be led by the majority and 
opposed by tho minority, even i£ the opposition is responsible . The 
problems which confront us in our relatione with other nations a!'e too 
immense for thie formula. Whenever there is partisan division on 
foreign problems as there was in the case of China policy several years 
ago the country suffers thereby even though one of the parties may gain 
a temporary advantage . 
The fact ie that foreign relatione are of transcendent im· 
portan..ce to all of us , to democrats and republicans alike and ought to 
be treated a• such. If they are to be conducted in a fashion which safe· 
guards the nation we must have more than majority lead,erehip and 
minority opposition. We must have the great/est possible common 
support for such action, from both paJ11ee and from all seetioJls of the 
country. 
The formula for invoking this type of aupport is not bo be 
found in leadership by one party coupled with opposition from the other. 
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Rather it lies in a positive approach, in an approach of responsible 
cooperation. This involves not only bipa.rtioenship. but what might be 
termed tripartisanship . What is needed is activo cooperation between 
both parties and also active cooperation between tho Executive Branch 
and the Congress, notably the Senate , to construct and maintain a 
more effective for eign policy . The need for the latter type of coopera .. 
tion 1e geneJ"aUy overlooked . Not infrequently, however, differences 
between the two branches of the govornm.ent &l"e a more si~icant 
!actor than differences between the two parties in Congress. 
As in bipaniaanship, the President must be the key fi~re 
in the development of uipartisanship . He must oupply the leadership 
and he must be prepared to assume ultimate responsibility for foreign 
relations . 
The President's decisive position derive~ in part from the 
fact that he ie the only elected figqre in the govel"nrnent with what is , 
in effect, a national constituency. Hence, he alone can spea'i: as the 
:repreaentative of the entire Amol'ican people . 
The Preaident•s key poeition also stems from his b:nplied 
ConaUtutional powers to conduct the foreign :relations of the United 
States. I s t ress the word "implied", !or the erroneous impre3sion 
has long existed that the President's power to conduct foreign relations 
is explicit and total in the Constitution. 
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Finally, the President's l<cy position in tdpartisanship 
reotQ on the fact that he wields the Executive power of the nation. He 
alone ha.s the resources in personnel and information necessary to the 
conduct of our relations with other nations. Congress does not have 
access to the innumerable sources of intelligence required iu the 
formation. of day-to-day policies . Congress has neither Ambassadors 
nor other agents over~eas essential to tho carrying out of policy. 
Finally, Conaress cannot cow..mand the armed forces in support of 
tho.t policy should it become necessary. 
Notwithstanding the key role of the President, Congress and 
especially the Senate abo have i~ortant functions in foreian policy. 
Io the first place Senators and Representatives are individually 
responsible to the peoples of their respective states and districts . 
Taken as a whole each House has a na.tioual constituency. These 
overlap each other and the President•o. Collectively, Congressional 
responsibilities to me people of the United States, in foreign policy as 
in other matters, parallel thnt of the President. These reeponsibilitie.a, 
however , must be exorcised in accordance Within Constitv.tional powers. 
Congress cannot l'epla.ee the President in the c:onduc;t of foreign relations 
without fundamental changes in our Constitution . By the ea.m.e token, 
however, the President cannot do without Congress in tha conduct oL 
these relations. 
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The most important of the Congressional powers related to 
foreign affairs of course are those of legislation and especially the 
appropriation of public funds. Congress provides for the Defense 
establishment. Congress provides for the Department of State and other 
agencies concerned with overseas relations. Congress authorities and 
appropriate• money for foTeign aid. Congress declares war and makes 
peace. 
Tbe Senate, in addition to its joint powers with the House 
also has cel'tain unique function in foreign relations. Two of the sc are 
explicit in the Constitution. The Senate confirms the appointment of 
Ambaseadol'B and other Presidential agents and it consents to the ratifi-
cation of treaties, the basic instruments of foroign l'elations. 
To the Senate also falls an implied Constitutional power of 
vast imp orta.nce • Thie power, not unlike the Pre aident• a implied 
authority to conduct foreign rtdatione, is the obligation to "advise and 
consent" in foreign relations. 
For long p~riods of time, the Senate's functions in this connec-
tion have lain dormant. In recent years, however, the power to advise 
and consent has been invoked repeatedly and often most vigorously. 
Sometimes it has operated before policy was established by the 
President and has served to stimulate its formation. That was the case 
in the Vandenberg Resolution adopted in 1948. Tho Resolution pt'omptoci 
the President to enter into negotiations with the Western European nations 
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with a viow to esta.bliahing common defense arrangem.enta. Out of this 
Con.grcssional ;.nitiative; eventually came the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organl7.ution and the elaborate NATO defense structure. 
The advice and consent function can also come into play a.s a 
corrective when the Executive Branch embarke impetuously on a 
major course of international action. '!'his use of the Senate's power 
is illustrated by the treatment of the recent Middle East resolution. 
In that instance. the President needed and sought Congressional cooper-
ation but he neglected to consult adequately and in advance with the 
appropriate Congressional le<:.dere. The manner in which his proposal 
was presented suggested that it had been drawn up hnstlly and without 
careful consideration of its many implications. Moreover, the whip of 
a. distorted bipartisanship was wielded and a sense of urgency was 
engendered which subsequent hearings clearly revealed to bt) unwarranted. 
Congress refused to be :Gtalnpeded by this misuse of bipartisan-
ship. The Senate gave th& mcaaul"e the most careful consideration and 
made numerous chelnges. In the end it adopted a revised and strengthened 
resolution by a heavy and a. non-pa.rtisa.n majority. 
If the relationship between the Executive and Legislative 
branches of the government is one leg on which tripa:rti~anship rests, 
the others 4l.re prov.ided by the two political parties . EaCh must be willing 
to place national interest above party advantage and to cooperate 
:responsibly with the other and with the President in the :formation and 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 51, Folder 36, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
) 
- 10 ~ 
support o! fo:-eign !>Olicy. Responsible cooperation does ';lOt ioply 
iropo!lec! agr~ement on 1nembers of either party when conscience compels 
disag:J:eement. It does require , however, an extra measure of restraint 
in dealing with question. a of foreign policy. It does require that both 
partins seek to construct rather than obstruct . 
The need for responsible cooperation from the parties is 
especially acute when as at p:ree;ent one is in control of the Executive 
Branch and the other is a majority in the Congress . In these circum-
stances, the President must avoid at all cocts seeking advantage for 
his party on foreign policy mcav.ures. I! for no oth~r rea.s-!)n, he is 
dependent upon the party in control of Congress for legislative leader-
ship in dealing with these measures . If his actionc augg~st partisanship 
they will inevitably beget parti9anship . 
Similarly. the majority party in Congress cannQt adopt a pa.t:-
tisan attitude on foreign relations without endansering the wellbeing of 
the nation. ln the long run. a non-partisan c.ours~ for tl.1~ majority 
party or any party is one o! enlightened self-interest . There is no 
last ing political advantage to be gained £ron:.t. placing party concern 
ahova the nation' s intereets . The people vi the nation are capable of 
assessing responsibility in elect ions !or politically-motivated a<;tions 
which daxr..age tho6e interests. 
The restraints which apply t1:> the majo1•ity party apply with 
equal or greater force to the minority party in Congress. It cannot seek 
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J:efugc in its minority status and leave to the majority the sometimes 
difficult taal. of :follo·wing the President's leadership in foreign policy. 
It cannot make political capital out of foreign policy, least of all when 
"t is in control o! th~ Executive Branch. 
The need for responsible cooperation, for "tripartiaanship'' 
in foreign policy ie widely recognized both in th ... Executive Branch and 
in the Congress . There is every :reason to believe that the President 
deeires lt. The majority and minority leaders of both Houaes of Congreee 
have Tepeatcdly spoken and acted in a fashion well calculated to produce 
it. 
1ihat i:3 lacY-..ing, however, c.re generally accepted procedures for 
bringing about such a policy en a continuing baais . The need ia most 
acute a.t two points in the foreign policy process, in the formulation of 
policy within the Executive Drancb and in its consideration prior to 
adoption as a national cou:r se of action . 
'rhe need in connection with formulation of policy c~uld be met 
in part if a principal assistant to the Secretary ot State were always tl) be 
designated from the opposite party whenever the latter was in control of 
the Souate. Thie appointment could be aupplemented by the addition o! 
other n1embers o£ the opposite party of proven co~etenco in foreign 
relations to policy-making positions in the Department of State in roqh 
proportion to the relative strengths o£ the two parties in the Senate. 
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The idea is no! wholly a new one. Both President Roosevelt 
and President Truman followed it in part at various time a. Recently 
President Eisenhower appointed the former chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Rclationtl Committee, Senator Walter F, George and James P. 
Richards, the former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
to poate in the Department of State . What is suggested here, however, 
is that this informal practice be established on a quasi-formal and 
continuing basis . 
Responsible cooperation is also needed before major courses 
of foreign policy are set. As noted, the procedure of triparti13an con-
sultation for tliis pur?ose exists and haa been used twice in recent 
weelte . 
Again, l'.fhat is lacking is not solely procedure but its 
acceptance and use as a regular instrumentality in the foreign policy 
proc~ss. Until now, th;} practice of advance Exe,cutivc-legtslative 
coneulta.tion has been a haphazard one. There ie no particular pattern . 
Presidents and their Secretaries of 'State have consulted at times with 
leaders of their own party. the opposition party or both parties. 
Sometimea they have chosen not to conS>u.lt at all. 
If there is to be effective cooperation in foreign policy, there 
is a need to formalize the procedw:.e of txipa.:~tiean consultation. I~ the 
early dayn of the Republic it was fuBv expected that the President would 
eeek the advice of the Senate in the conduct of foreign relat1ons . This 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 51, Folder 36, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 51, Folder 36, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
.. z-
mor to this ity durin th a.r d 
th comm 
c:c. There a a1 o c cr t action thin the 
t to pro unity. Durin th n.r, Preeid t Roo cv lt 
promin t Rc llcnno lnt th Gov r nt to ~Y po ltiona. 
point 4 o epUbllca.nu to hie cnbin t, H nry L. tims o 
cr tn.ry f ~ r u • Fr "nox ns S cr tllry of tho Navy. Ho t>J.oo 
ti bll bin th Unit ... d N t1on 1 • m mbcro of th 
o1 othprUs r c sult 4 clr ntly y tho Root velt 
strati • 
om thin imU too rth .me n ... ction 
rSball Pl North Atlantic Tr nty anlzation. Th-
lde of cl)ar ng a pro11r m of nld to tb •ar •I' vi h d. lando of 
a not pi:'Un~ uddcnly on th Consroa • Th 1 t 
nb ra. ~l1..:.lrmnn of th Committ 
th cy by tb D moc:r .... tlc c.drnlni tr ion. en lt cnrn to providin 
for c on defenc for ouraelv & d ,lt aath 
Vu.n eolutlon in th eont WblCh p in d y to NATIJ. 
B p tioanshiY> rv d in th ae a.y as efi ctlv instrument 
o£ for 1gn pOl ley. It hlod Pr.o l cnt Roo•ov lt an • f r a time. President 
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Truman to cnrry on our relation ith other autiou&, cue in tb 
that th y had bclU.nd th m v ry nu.bsta.Jltial m aaUJ." of uppon 
from both p ni o. DIU d tate olic:y comm nde4 reap ct abro d becaue 
it a.a firmly l'ooted at hom • 
Th cem at of blpantsanShip boaaa to slve way under the 
pr ssure of evcata ill tho Eu £ast. In l'ap1d auecoaalon came the Communist 
uccas in Chin , the inc:oncluaive coniUct illll:<.orea aAd the dispute ovel' 
Ci nernl Mac nhur. Unfortunat ly. th D mocl'atic Admialatratlm& was 
not v ry ucceasful either 1D romotina blp rUtanBblp 011 these matter• or 
ln communic:atm£ u understandiag of its actlona or policlc a to the p ople 
f the United tate . This faUuro provided an opponuDlty to xucmiets, 
1 g t of ow r. to pull nll the political atop a iD attacks on foreip pOlicy. 
xtremlam tell~ 4 to beget extremism. lth the l&Ddermlaing 
of the will :to cooperate, bipanlsaDahip lD foreign policy b came iDcJ>eaalngly 
Q.1l omp~ wol'd. It was invoked oft n tJilO\Igb as though lt were some kind of 
litany Which U r poated over and over nsaln would meure popularity for 
wap~uln:r policl s. It was used as d.\ib to U nee reapooslble criticism 
of foreign oUcy. It was wielded ae a whip ln elf one by th Executive 
Bl' h to Ul" e mcaevoa of fOl'eign poUc:y tJutoup Collareea. Wiause of 
bl artlaansblp l.n these ways t ad d to llllllmulate lD time pr claoly th 
oppo lt I" actloD. 
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Bi ilrtlsanGbip is not ~gi.cal formula cnpable of producing 
tionol Wlo.o:lmlty whor there are deep Clivi ions. Nor is it a convenient 
cl under which to coneoat th ... s divlti s fro- forel n yeo. 
. mcric ns dificr on torcign ls c no less than dom otic 
issues. Blpartioanohip cannot c&~clse thcss dlUcronccs. Prop rly 
unc1oret.ood end used, however. tt con help to m.tnimt~o them. !t c&n 
net to produce th ~iclost pusvible ar n of ccommoc1D.tion n1ong :oectiona.l 
and pony viow_poiatG b; support of esocntll:ll ctlon bJ~oad. And then ed 
for thi acco:m:n.oda.tion i very peat in e orld which bn cloeed in 
r idly on th nation. 
In domestic nUtat-s. leMorohi!' from ... majority party and 
••r spou iblo opposition" from tho minority ia normally ouUictent to 
p th country on ll level keel. In toJ"cl n affairs. h ever. this 
polltlcbl m cbaniom le no longer adequate for o£fecUve no.donal action. 
It iG not nougb that foreign policy bo led by th mnjority nnd Oll~oscd by 
tho r.ntnorlty • ovon if the opposition ia Jr"oponsiblo. Th probleu!& whieh 
confr t us ln out" relations ith otbor na.tlona a.ro too lmmonsc for this 
fo:rmul . \ h ... n there is pnrtiGan divlaion on forei n problomo as th ... re 
aa in the c ae o1 Fu Eastern policy. th .country ouff roth r by evcu 
tb r.h one of tho purties m y gain t .. mpor ey ndv 
Th !ac:t: is th:lt tor lgn t."cl tion e of traneecn&mt importnnce 
to all of u • to ~mocl"ats ruu ((~ UbUcllnlJ nU nd out;bt to be tren.t .... cl ns 
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uch. U th y re to be conducted in rds th nation 
w must h v mor than majt)rity 1 adersbip liJld minority oppo ltion. e 
muf.it ha.v th re t at possibl~ eup ort for •u.ch action, &om botla parties 
n .... &o all cti JUJ of th c oun~. 
Th formUla for lnvokln thle typ of. sup oa-t la Dot to be 
found in 1 ad J'lhl by one 1'ty coupl Cl with oppoaW.oa from tM otber. 
thor it U s in a po ltive a.pp&-o ch, lD n approach of re1ponsibl~ 
00\lpere.tion. Tbl lrlvolvos not blpnl'titsanahl • but what mlpt be term d 
tl'lpartlaanahip. lllat la n oded ia ctiv co peraUoa b tw en both 
p l'tlea d also ctlve cooper tion b tween th Exeaatlve BJ'aac:'b and 
the Coa&resel . notably th DCBO.te. Th 'IW a fOJI tbh latteJ" typ ol coopor-
tlon is one I' ally ov rloolted. Not lnlrequcatly, how ver, cUlferenc:ea 
b tweeu the two branchc e of th govoram nt are a more •lgalficut factor 
tha.u differ aces tw en the two pa.ril • ln Congreas. 
a ln blpa.rti8n.nshlp, the r eidom Dl\lst b th k y fit'Ue 
ln the dev lopm nt o1 tl'lpa1't:1sar.ushlp. H :must Gupply th lcader&hlp and 
b must b pr p8.1" c1 to assum ultimate rcaponslbUlty lo~ fol'elgu 
r lo.tlona. Th Pl'c~nt's dedslv position derives primarily &om t 
fact that b ls tho ODly ele~ed fisur lD the gove~ameut wlth wUt ls. In 
effect, a oatlozu.\1 c.onatlm ... ncy. H ~ace, be alOD can lp(tak a the repro-
entaUvc of tho oDUI'c Amedee p cplc. 
Tho President's y p ltlon also atcma &om bla lmpUod 
CouatituUonnl pow IJ'G to conduct th .. fol' lE;n l'el tiOils f th Urdt c1 Stat s. 
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I etresa tho ord ttlmptl~d", for the erroneous imp~e•olon h long 
xist d thnt th Prcsid.ent1 power to c · ct foreitn :rel tion ts explicit 
:nd total in the Con tltu.tion. 
Finally, the President's y position in triparti anehip t' o;to 
on tho fnct that h m lds the Executive power of the nntt.on. Ho Blouo ba£ 
there ources in peracnnol and information ncceoa:1:ry to tho conduct of our 
relations with other nations. Cong:- ce does not have access to th-
innumcrahle sources of intelligence required in th formation of d :y-to·dny 
polic;ieo. Congres has neither A:mbacsadors nor othar a~ uta overscao 
ss ntial to the carryinG out of policy. l:"'inatiy, Conza-et:Hil cannot command 
the n:rm d forces in upport of that poliey should it become noccasary. 
Notwithstanding tho r .. ey role of the Proeidcnt. Con rc•o and 
op clnlly the Sonate oleo have important lunetlons in forclcn policy. 
Senntors and Reprce ~tivos ar in ·vldually raaponsible to the :pcopl a 
of their respeetlvi! totes and district but taken na a whole ach !louse of 
Consrcs& !me nattonal constlt\lcncy. Thcae ov rlap each. other and tho 
resident•,o. Collectiv ... ly, Congr aeionnl rooponoibWtios to tbe pe~lc of 
the United StE'.too. in foreign policy as in other :matters. parallel tho of 
the Pr Gidcnt. Thee~ r sponslbUities. however, tnUEJt bo cxcrelood in 
uccor&.nco wi · tho Conatitution. Congr<tnG eannat roplaco the President 
ln th conduct of foreign rol tlone ithout fundamental chan es in our 
Constitutional syntcm. By the snmc tolton, however, the President cannot 
do without Cou ress in tho conduct ol thcco rel ttons. 
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The mo tim ortant of th Con r all nol ow re r lat d to 
for l n affairs of cour ue tho I l gial U n sp dally th appro-
rl ti n of public funds. Conp-e s rovid s for tke Def n& estabU hment. 
C n eaa pl'ovi s for the D partn nt of tate and other ; ... Del a conce~ d 
with ov :rs r 1 tlon. . Con rca uthoriz and ppropriatos money for 
foreign id. Congr as d cl r a war and makes poace . 
The 6enat , In addition. also h s cezo&aln unique functions in 
for lgn relations. T ~o of these ar explicit in the Constitution. The 
cna.t confirms th appointm nt of Ambaasndol's nd other Prcald"'Dtlal 
o.g nta an it con tnt& to the raUfication of treat! 1 , the basic lastnamonta 
f foral 11 rclatiOG&. 
To th S tc also falls l'.n im 1l d Con titutl nal pow r o1 
vast lm., ortanc • This power, not unltk th Pr al nt'e implied authority 
to conduct forolp r lations. is the obligaUoa. to ' dviso ru~d couso11t' iD 
foreign ro tiona. For long periods of t1mc, tho nat '• funetl ne in tbia 
connection have l.e.lu dormant. In recon' ttmos, hoWQv~r. me powor to 
advise and consent bas be n 1uvok<.s~1 repeatedly o.nd oft n most vigorously. 
o~tim e lt bna operated b for policy was atalJliah 4 by th Pr sideat 
and h sczove to stimulate ita formation. Tht\t wa.a tho case with the 
- whiCh v d th wfl for adhcr c to tb Ua:ait 4 Nattoo -
FWbz-1ght a aolutlon in 194 nd the Vand.onh r R sol\ltion ln 1946. 
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The :vie na con ut lunetlon e 
COJ'ro.cti a& Wu u.ated by the trec.t nt of th 
Doeb- id.c.U net ... :rly this yc r. b. 
nt n d d Cougsoossioual coop r tion ut 
c: 
o-c:all 
tin tane ~ th 
1 ctcd to 
con \lit in ilv Q.CC with the np_p%Qt rtat ConJ;r 8 1 len }1fl. The 
l" in whiCh a his r~ro-;: osal r over muaeost cl thttt 
it had been taawn up haetUy tmd Viitlmut c reful <:Cllaidtrrattcn of ita n1u.ny 
im llcation . ltl th end th cocnato r viocd m atrength ll"d th 
a- olud.on to-,.e approvf.ll.g it; by a h avy ud n D .. l nrtisau majoJ"ity. 
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from the For lgn Relation• ~on,mitte a well • S nator Tom Henning• 
~ 
of Miesourl a• Secretary ~·,~~_D ... cJocratic Party and myaet£, aa 'Whip, from 
ontana. From the Houle came majority leader John McCormack of 
Maasachueette, the Whip. Carl Albert of Oklahoma, the Chairman of tha 
Forei&n Affair& Committoe, Tom Gol'don of lllino •· and Spoakor Rayburll. 
When tho Republic&nl in attendance ar added to thia a ·roup, a 
picture of aeoarapblc repretentation emerao• which covert every tector of 
the nation. lt leo embraces virtually all abades of opinion in both partiea 
in Conarcae. 
Polley made by the Pretident and tho Secretary o£ State against 
a background o! lhle kind it alrnoat certain to c rry areater measure of 
public and Congreeeional tupport than policy made without h. It 1e likely 
to be, moreovcn,., more reaatul'ing to !rlendly nationo abroad. 
If tho relationthlp between tho Executive and Lcaialative brancbea 
of the government la on tog on whlcb tripartltan•hip .r at8, tho othcn·e a.ro 
provided by the two political partlea. Th neo4 for roaponeible cooperation 
from the partlet is eepeciaUy aeute when at at present one is in control of 
e Exccutiv Branch and the other il a majority in the Congrees. In thoee 
circumttane 1, the Preeidont muat avoid tall costs eeeking advantaae for 
hie party on for elan policy meaeurea. U for no oth r rca ton. be it dependent 
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upon the party in control of Congreea fo~ leaialative leadertblp. 
S1milarly, the majority party in Consre•• cannot adopt a partiean 
attitude on foreign relation• without endanaoring the wellbeina of the nation. 
In the long run. a non·pa.rtil&n courae it the courae of enliahtened 1elf-intereet 
!or any party. There ia no laatina political return to be galrlecl trom placina 
party advantaa~ above the nation'• interotte. Sooner or-later, the people of 
the nadon will ataeas reapontibility in election• lor politically-motivated 
action• which damaae tb.,.e interet it. 
Tho reetrainte which apply to tho majority party apply with equal 
or greater force to the minority party in Conarees. lt cannot eeek refuae in 
ita minol'ity et&tul and leave to the majority the eometimee difficult taek of 
followina the Preeident't leacler1hip in foreian policy. It cannot make political 
capital out o£ fore!an rolicy, leaet o1 all when it ie in control o£ the Executive 
Branch. 
The need tor re•pontib\e eooporation, for ' tripartitanehip" in 
foreign polley ie wldoly recognized both in the Executive Bl"&ncb and in the 
Congre• •· What il atilt lac kina, however. are aenerally accepted procedure• 
!or brinaina about aueb a policy on a contlnuina baeia. The need ie moat 
acute at two plintl, in the foreign policy proceet. in the formulation of policy 
within the Executive Branch and in ite cona1deration prior to adoption a• a 
national .::our•3 o! action 
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The 110ed in conn ction with formulation of policy could be met 
ln part if prlnelp&l aeeiatant to the S cretary of Stat were to be deelanated 
ae a matter of r plar pra:Uce from the OtpO eite party whenever thll latter 
was in control of the Senate. Thie appointment could be euppcment~d by tho 
addition o! other membore of the opposite tarty to p>ti<:y-maldnJ position• in 
the D partment o£ State. 
The idea le not wholly a new one. Both Preaident Rooaevelt and 
Pr eid nt Truman followed it in part at varioue times. Recently Presid-nt 
Eie nhower appointed the former cbabman of th Senate Foreian Relations 
Committ e. S nator Walter F. Oeorae and Jamoa P. 1charda, the former 
chairman of the Houac For~ign AffalTs Committ c, to post• in the Depart-
m nt o! State. ~ hat 1a IUJI<:Ited here, howov r. la that thla informal 
practice be oetabli8hed on a quaei-formal and continuing baele. 
Rca(.Onaible COOJ»r&tion ia abo needQd before maJor eoux-aet o! 
lor ian poUcy are •~-t. As noted, contuhation l.or thia purpoae haa been 
uaed from dmo to time. Aaain, what b lacklna ia not a procedur but :lt.e 
acceptance and uae aa a l'eialar inatrumentaUty in the foreian pollcy procoea. 
Until now, the practice o! a.dvan~e cxecutive-legtelatlvc con•ultation bat been 
a baph&£ard ono. Tber ta no particular pattern. Pre1ldent1 and their 
Secretariee d. State hav conaultoc1 at times wlth leaders ot th4:ir own party. 
with th oppoeltion party or ith both parties. Sometime• th y have cboeen not 
to contuh at all. 
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U n·• i• to be ef!ectlve cooperation in loroian policy- there l• a aeed 
epublie it wa• fully ~cte4 that tho l'ee14ent wocld. 1eek tile a4vlce or libe 
enate in tbe conduct or !oreip re\at on•. Thi• :&alent coaetltutioaal coacept 
ellou\4 be revivttd anAl ad.juetea to the l'eaUtie• o£ tbe pr••••t day. 
It it of eolJrle impo11ible for the Prencleat to CODI'IIlt with dt.e 
nth'e eute. I IUJI•It• however. bat •• a r•a,dar ancl coatbau Jll practice 
the Pretid llt mlpt meet with the majority ua minority leade:r1 of th• S~t• 
a• we\1 &I tlle chairman o! the Committee on orei&a llelatlOD.I and ltl rank na 
minority member prior to embar~ on any ~r~ajol' c:olUia of foreian pollcy. 
The compraral»ca member• ol til Hou•e ol a prele.ntativea 1houl• 1M illcla4e4 
involve action by the entire Conar•••. 
However, a4equta. proce41\ll'al d.evlc"• are not a •u'betiwte for dt.e 
will to cooperate in aa!eauarcltna the illtereata of the JMOplo of the Uatte4 State•. 
cannot 
Proce4ur•• ~eplace tllo loaderthip ucl the ultimate reepootlbiUty or the Pre• cleat 
au4 _Usc reepontiblUty of ucl& uutmber of Coape11. hat dley caa 4o, however, 
reduce the pa.rt1tan !actor. They ca.n. al•o moblliae the fulleat po1aible tt ,_.t of 
our reaourcea in lntelt1Jence ancl experi nee for meatiu.a the areataat o! O\H" A-.ti.ou1 
probl ma. In abort, !or What i8 at b••t an amblauou• 1'1laUoa1h£p lmowa &I bi· 
parti•an•hlp lbe1o procecture1 can llelp to procluce a tl'ip&J'tilanablp with a ccm-
cr t nAiledyiDa ab'uctue. Unt••• we move ln Ude dlrectlon we Wtlll:aave to 
faco tb• claaotic proepect that oc::h party a• well •• the Pre1ident and the Coqre11 
may atrike out etr~ctly on lt• o-.m ta lore111l potlcy. Thla cour1e WO\Iht be aR in· 
vtcatton to national ditatter. 
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